The Senate debate on the League of Nations by Packard, Ann
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Honors Theses Student Research
4-1-1969
The Senate debate on the League of Nations
Ann Packard
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/honors-theses
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Research at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Packard, Ann, "The Senate debate on the League of Nations" (1969). Honors Theses. Paper 227.
THE SENATE DEBATE 
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Presented by 
Ann Packard 
Hay 12, 1969 
The Treaty of Versailles and, more importantly, the Covenant of 
the League of Eations contained in that treaty have been the subjects 
of much debate and speculation since their- final defeat by the United 
States Senate in 1920. This debate has centered on the question of 
who was responsible for the defeat of the treaty. Some blame Uilson 
for his obstinacy in refusing to allow the Democratic senators to vote 
for ratification of a treaty containinG P.epublican reservations. 
Others put the responsibility in the hands of tho Republican majority 
led by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge. A number of influences shaped the 
reactions and attitudes of the various senators and caused them to 
vote the way they did. As the Senate debate unfolded the position of 
ea.ch indivic1ual senator and of factions within the Senate became 
increasingly clear. 
President )Jilson began talking and writing about a league of nations 
before the United States even entered tho war with Germany. As early 
as 1914 he suggested that all nations should become pa.rt of an inter-
national association designed to maintain peace in the world. Eis 
January 1917 speech to Congress elaborated a number of points, includine 
one on the establishment of a league of nations, that were later incor-
porated into his Fourteen Points address, delivered in early 1918. His 
war message on April 2, 1917 and a message to the Russian people in I1ay 
of the same year also expressed his belief in the need for an interna-
tional peace organization that would be setlup at the peace co:ri.f erence 
at the end of the war.l 
2 
Opposition to Wilson's proposed program came primarily from the 
Republican camp, especially the Republican members of the Senate. Henry 
Cabot Lodge, Minority Leader of the Senate and ranking Republican on 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had been opposed to '\'Tilson' s 
league idea since the beginning of 1917. He felt it contained too many 
new ideas that could be dangerous for American interests. 2 As the war 
progressed Lodge was joined by other Republican senators who felt that 
Wilson's power should be curbed and that control of the country's 
policies should be returned to Congress where it had been before the 
great increase in presidential power due to the war. The severity of the 
attacks on Wison and his policies during the Congressional election of 
1918 prompted him to go before the country and appeal for a vote of 
confidence. He asked the voters to return a Democratic majority to both 
houses of Congress in order to allow him to conduct the peace negotia-
tions as he had proposed and to continue the programs he had already 
begun. The Republicans took this appeal as a direct insult to their 
abilities and as a challenge concerning who really represented the 
country. The election of a Republican Senate in November, although only 
by a majority of two seats, seemed to them to indicate that the public 
had repudiated the President's leadership and was demanding a change) 
1·lilson' s determination to go to Paris himself as a peace negotiator 
and his failure to appoint any senators, either Republican or Democrat, 
to the peace commission despite the outcome of the election served to 
crystallize the growing Republican opposition in the Senate. Even 
before the treaty was submitted to the Senate for ratification the 
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members had split into three camps: the irreconcilables, who were 
opposed to the treaty in any form: the mild reservationists, who 
supported a leaQJ.e of nations in principle but desired amendments to the 
league as proposed by Wilson; and the senators, almost all Democrats, 
who supported the league exactly as it was brought from Paris by Wilson. 
Henry Cabot Lodge, now Majority Leader and chairman of the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, attempted to hold together the Republican majority, 
made up of members of all three camps, in order to prevent Wilson from 
achieving his goal. The Republicans were determined not to allow Wilson 
to gain any more prestige or power over governmental affairs. They 
wanted to reassert the control of Congress after the great gains in 
presidential power made durin~ the war and to prevent Hilson from 
gaining more personal glory both at home am abroad. ':Tilson was equally 
as determined that the treaty would be ratified exactly as it was 
presented to the Senate. All throuEh the debate he continued to instruct 
the Democratic ~inority to vote against any reservations or amendments 
introduced by the Republicans. As a result of the bickering the treaty 
was voted down by the Senate twice in ITovember 1919, once by the opposi-
tion of the Democrats to the treaty with the Lodge reservations attached 
and once by the Republicans voting against an unamended treaty. The 
treaty was brought back for reconsideration at the next session of Congress 
(1920) and again defeate2 for tho final time. 4 
Virginia had three different senators involved in the league debates, 
Thomas S •. Hartin, Claude A. Swanson, and Carter Glass. 1·fartin, 1,fuo had 
been elected to his fifth term in the Senate in 1918, was in line to 
become Democratic floor leader in the 66th Congress. ~Tilson was opposed 
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to 1".artin' s election because of Hartin' s opposition to Hilson' s nor:tlna-
of 1Cj10l • 
tion at the Democratic National Convention. °'.'Jhen Martin saw his support 
dwindling he withdrew from the race and John ~T. Kern of Indfa.m:. was 
elected. The Wilson.lMartin feud ended at this point. A great believer 
in and supporter of party unity, Martin supported most of ~'Filson' s 
programs simply because the two men were of the same political party. 
Wilson also buried the hatchet and made a special effort to win I-:artin 1 s 
support because he needed every vote he could get to carry out his 
programs.5 In 1916 Hartin was elected Majority Leader and continued 
to serve as head of the Democratic party in the Senate until his death, 
He took no actual part in the debates on the league due to his absence 
from the Senate in the early stages. Having been taken seriously ill in 
the early part of June 1919, he died on Eovember 12, 1919, just one -vreek 
before the league was voted on for the first time. His ability to keep 
the Democratic senators in line and his mastery of parliamentary procedure 
were sorely needed in the struggle with the Republican majority over the 
league. As early as June people recognized that Hartin 1 s absence was a 
definite disadvantage to the Democrats trying to carry out Hilson 1 s 
peace policy.6 
Claude A. Swanson, also a leader of the Democratic machine in 
Virginia, was a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Com.rnittee. 
·,"' 1"11a 
Although he too originally voted against 'l·lilson at the convention,_ he 
became an active campaigner for 1·lilson and a staunch supporter of Wilson's 
policies. He was chosen to give the opening speech for the administration 
in the treaty fight and had a number of conferences with ~Iilson to 
discuss strategy.? 
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Appointed by Governor Westmoreland Davis to fill the vacancy in the 
Senate caused by the death of Senator Hartin, Carter Glass acceptod his 
new position the day before the first vote on the treaty nas taken but 
did not actually assume his seat until February 1920. ~Ie therefore 
missed most of the inter-party wrangling over the treaty and the league. 
His intimate friendship with ~'lilson, stemming from his sponsorship and 
guidance of the Federal Reserve System bill in the House and his term 
as Secretary of the Treasury, was an added factor in his unfailing support 
of ·wilson 1 s peace- program. 
Ifore ·ifn:_)ortant than tho fact thn.t thP. league was defeated is the 
part played by certain individuals~ and groups in bringin~ about this 
defeat. Everyone had his own idea on what the league and the treaty 
meant or would mean to the United States and to the international situa-
tion. At times these ideas came in conflict with each other and made 
av-eement on the treaty difficult if r.i.ot impossible. Wilson 1 s o•,m 
attitude toward the league was particularly uncompromising. He s::i.w the 
League of Hations as absolutely essential to the preservation of world 
peace and United States participation in the lear:;ue as the only means 
whereby the league would be effective. In addition, this league nrust be 
formed at the peace conference in order to insure that all nations would 
join and aEree to follow the principles set forth by -:·Iilson, His idealistic 
attitude toward the league and what it could accomplish was not shared by 
the other negotiators. Both Great Britain and France tried to write into 
the peace treaty more provisions to benefit themselves and to protect 
themselves from future German a13gression. They also tried, with some 
success, to prevent adoption of amendments desired by American public 
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opinion that they felt would weaken the parts of the treaty they already 
donsidered too weak. They were finally forced to back d01m on their 
claims somewhat by Wilson's threat to pack up and leave if tho peace 
principles uere not accepted. 8 
IV\ J U...l'-j l Cj l Cf 
Hhen 1Jilson returned homo.A. he ·i;,ras faced with another fie;ht to get 
the treaty ratified by the Senate so that the United States could become 
a member of the League of ~fations. As the Senate fight progressed it 
became more and more apparent that Wilson 1vas unwilling to accept any 
amerdments or reservations to the league, not even those proposed by 
members of his own party. After he had been asked to compromise 
nun:erous times, he answered his opponents by saying that he had no moral 
right to accept changes in son:ething that had already been sic::ncd. To 
accept reservations would be highly detrimental to the country's honor 
and would lose the United States nmch of its prestie:e abroaa.9 Then 
too, accepting Ar.ierican reservations r.iight induce the other countries to 
try to gain concessions they had been unable to achieve before. l·~any 
people contended that. if the United States Senato added amendments or 
roserYations, the treaty would have to be resubmitted to the peace 
conference, giving the other countries a chance to propose new amend-
ments. This would also create problems idth the Allies' ability to force 
the peace settlement on Germany. This is one of the reasons 1·!ilson 
considered anything but acceptance of the treaty exactly as it stood as 
a nullification of the treaty, the league, and the principles behind them. 
The ideas of the Democratic minority loyal to Wilson on the treaty 
were somewhat mixed, especially in the later stages of the debate. 
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At first most of the Democrats supported 'Tilson whole-heartedly despite 
any personal reservations they might have had to his demands for passage 
of the treaty exactly as it was submitted to the Senate. The division 
along party lines on many of the votes, such as those on the fall 
----rv> "'Y'.\ a..s 
amendments and the appeals to the Senate on Vice-President" Ear shall ts 
rulings, indicates the extent to which the Democrats followed ',Jilson 1 s 
desires. lO Si·;ranson' s statements on the ?all amsindm8nts arc fairly 
roprosentative of the Democratic attitude to the treaty. Siranson voted 
against all of these amendments. To him, amending the treaty meant 
that it would have to be sent back to the conference for acceptance in 
its new form, causing a long delay in implementation of the treaty and 
ostablishment of the league. Ho felt that the United States had an 
obligation to the other countries to see that the treaty was properly 
carried out; therefore, no restrictions shor;r.a be put on United States 
participation on any commission set up by the treaty, as adoption of some 
of the ?all amendments would have done. Swanson also announcod that if 
Senator Hartin had been present he too c·rould have voted against all tho 
amendments. 11 Swanson 1 s views reflect somewhat :-Tilson 1 s idealistic 
belief in the necessity of United States participation in the league if 
it was to succeed. He also emphasized tho urgent need for a quick 
acceptance of the treaty so that its provisions could be put into prac-
tice immediately to alleviate the chaotic .situation in T~urope. 
There were, however, some members of the Democratic uing in the 
Senate who, unlike Swanson, came to feel that unquestioning support of 
T·!ilson was not necessarily in the best interests of the country. As 
long as they thought the president would accept whatever kind of treaty 
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the Senate was willing to pass even if it were not in the form ho had 
requested, the Democrats would stand by Hilson and 'Tote as he wished. 
After his statement of early !!:arch saying that he would refuse to accept 
any reservations then being considered by tho Senate tha Democrats 
realized that the situation was hopeless. They had to decide either to 
stick with '.Tilson and defeat the treaty or to desert him and take the 
best terms they could get under the circumstances. Ea'1y of the Democrats 
did not approve of the president 1 s attitude toward the tree.ty. They 
considered him fanatically attached to an ideal that the rest of the 
world was unready to accept. The advocates of reservations were only 
trying to safeguard America by guaranteeins her continued sovereignty; 
they were not attempting to prevent tho actual establishment of a 
12 league. As evidenced py the final vote taken l~arch 19, 1920, twenty-
one Democratic senators, having decided that an amended treaty was 
bettor than no treaty at all, voted against :'!ilson 1s leadership by voting 
for the approval of the amended treaty. 13 Sven this was not e'1ough to 
bring about passage of the treaty, It failed to obtain a two-thirds 
majority and was sent back to Hilson with a note to the effect that the 
Senate refused to consent to it. 
w • .,.,. 
The irreconcilables or bitter-enders, led by Senators, Borah and \l~1\c...v":.kv-
Knox, were the most vocal in their opposition. They were against any 
mention of a league in the peace treaty and took the initiative in the 
debate in the weeks and months before any details of the settlement were 
knovm in the United States. The activity of this adamant group gave the 
unmistakable impression that the treaty was going to be a partisan issue. 
f6~+ex 
Although .Senator :LfoCumber, the only Republican who voted for ratification 
-i 
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no matter what the terms, tried to cJnvince the public that the Republican 
party as a whole was not opposed to a league, the pro-league Republican 
faction was strangely silent. It allowed the irreconcilables to get the 
upper hand at the very beginning and made it impossible for the party to 
unite on any of the crucial votes later. Ifot even Senator Lodge with his 
great abilities as a leader was able to get the irreconcilables to 
adhere to the program of reservations supported by the Republican 
. •t 14 d maJori Y• The question of whether Lodge really wante a treaty with 
reservations or whether he personally sided with the irreconcilables is 
not particularly relevant to this discussion and will not be taken uu 
here. 15 
Lodge was the leader of the mild reservationists, those who were 
for a league in principle but who were unwilling to accept T;:ilson 1 s 
league. They felt that certain amendments would have to be made to 
',Tilson 1 s proposal before it would be acceptable. !1ost of the changes 
involved were simply measures to insure the continued sovereignty of the 
United States over its international relations and to guarantee that 
Congress would retain its constitutional control over the president. The 
key argument of the mild reservationists for reservations seemed to be 
the safeguarding of American ideals and security. During the July 
debates Senator Lenroot based his entire justification of the necessity 
of reservations on tho upholding of the principle of "Americanism'' and the 
need for clarifying a number of points that many senators felt rr~ght later 
jeopardize the position of the United States. 16 Although all of the 
amandments introduced failed to receive a two-thirds majnrity, the Lodge 
reservations were approved and attached to the resolution of ratification 
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before any of the final votes were taken, (Pote: an amen:::lment could be 
attached only to the original treaty; a res8rvation, often containing the 
same revision as a previously proposed and defeated amendment, was 
attached to the ratification resolution to serve as an indication of 
conditional acceptance. Both had the same purpose, to prevent the 
treaty from being adopted in the form in which it was proposed.) The 
inability of the mild reservationists to get the Republican irreconcil-
ables to agree to a joint program or to gain anything but token support 
from the Democrats made it impossible for the treaty with reservations 
to pass. lfoither could the Democrats muster a majority for their program. 
The wb.ole situation was a total impasse. 
':lith the Senate divided into three camps one might assume that the 
number of votes for and against various proposals made durin8 the debates 
would vary considerably, depending on the measure being voted on and the 
combining of two of the factions on one side or the other. In r..ost 
instances this turned out not to be the case, The voting split was 
almost exclusively on the basis of partisanship, straight Democrat-
Republican, with the exception of a very few senators who completely 
switched sides and voted as if they were loyal members of the other 
party. Party politics was one of the major factors in shaping the 
attitudes of many of the senators toward the treaty and the league. They 
gave no real thought to what either the treaty or the league meant and 
blindly followed the party leaders 1 dictates. This made their stand at 
times inconsistent and unrealistic. 
The hearings in the Foreign Relations Committee '\·!ere a prime example 
of the role of partisanship in steering the course of the treaty. President 
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Hilson had presented the treaty to the Senate on ,July 10, 1919, in a 
speech in which he tried to explain the nature of the provisions and to 
give reasons for the quick approval of the treaty. Democrats generally 
were very enthusiastic about the effect of the speech, Swanson called 
it. 11 magnificent, able, eloquent and inspiring" arrl said that "The reasons 
presented for the ratification of the treaty, including ~he league of 
nations, were strong, cogent and unanswerable." Nost of the Republicans 
were highly critical, accusing ~Tilson of explaining the general principles 
behind the treaty and neglecting the specific details. Borah claimed 
that Hilson refuted his own statement about it being a 1eague to enforce 
peace by stating that the league was "an alliance for warr'~ 17 Swanson 
a.ttempted to defend Wilson by asserting that it was not expected or 
possible to discuss details of the league in a speech of the kind given 
by \iilson, The audience lacked the background knowledge and the technical 
experience to be able to grasp these details from such a short mention 
of them. 18 
The Senate referred the treaty to the Foreign Relations Corn..1'Jli ttee 
where the Republicans immediately began a complete reading aloud of the 
treaty in order to give themselves time for the formulation of amendments. 
Lodge also requested additional information from :Iilson on the treaties 
with Poland and France, information which, according to Lodge, uas 
absolutely vital to further consideration of the treaty. 19 The Democrats 
on the com,'llittee were against any delay in consideration. At first they 
did not think it was necessary to request more information from the 
President, but they finally consented to ask ~-Tilson for the treaty with 
Poland and b:ro agreements on the Rhine •20 At the same time Lodge proposed 
12 
/ c;._ bct\<e 0 f C-a>'ft..,...iw>; be+ ... 11J.•~<1-. "J(;..l'W.'I\ O"l) ~Vl d CJ...1 l<(I., 
an amendment regarding the provision an Shantung,A Swanson objected 
vigorously to this beginning in the middle of the treaty. He felt that 
the committee should begin by considering the league provisions and work 
straight through in order until it reached the end. To Swanson, jumping 
in the middle at Shantung made it appear that a majority of the cormnittee 
was tryine: to pick out something to make it clear that the majority's 
object was the defeat of the treaty. Swanson voiced the hope that a 
majority of the whole Senate would not support this particular amendment. 
He ·was confident that enough Republicans would vote uith the Democrats 
to defeat it. 21 Perhaps Swanson was closer to the truth than he was 
willing to admit even to himself. It is possible that the Republicans 
were trying to show the Senate that it was useless to try to get any kind 
of treaty except the one the Republicans ·were willing to allow. At any 
rate, this exchange does serve to show the partisan character of the 
struggle. 
As the Foreign Relations Committee finally ordered the treaty 
reported back to the Senate it contained approximately forty-five amend-
ments and four reservations, most of which had been approved by a vote of 
nine to eight, the Republican-Democrat split of the committee·. The 
majority report refuted all the charges of unnecessary delay leveled against 
the committee and said there would be no problem in getting the amendments 
approved by the other powers since the conference was still in session 
in Paris.22 The report also requested immediate Senate approval on all 
amendments and reservations in order to protect American interests. Total 
acceptance of this recommendation, however, would have meant virtual 
lJ 
rejection of the league as far as the United States was concerned. 
These provisions took away what little control the league would have had 
and gave the final decision in any controversy to the Congress. 
The minority committee report, introduced by Senator Hitchcock, 
!1inority Leader of the Senate, and signed by all Democratic merrbers of 
the committee except Shields, demanded immediate ratification of the treaty 
without amendments or reservations and charged the majority members of 
the coM.i~ittee with obstructing the treaty. The report stated that the 
reservations were introduced solely for the purpose of destroying the 
league and nullifying the treaty. 23 Obviously this charge-trading did 
nothing to ease the animosities between the two sides; on the contrary, 
it more than likely tightened the lines and made it even more difficult 
to achieve a middle grotind. One of the points it should have begun to 
make clearer was that the issues were not being decided on their o•m 
merit. The senators were not really considering what would be in the 
best interests of the United States or of world peace. They might have 
thought and said they were, but in reality the issues were being decided 
on the basis of party politics, 
Partisanship continued to dowinate the debates and the voting in the 
Committee of the ~·Jhole in the Senate. In an editorial in :mid-October 
the Richmond Times-Disoatch quoted Senator Hitchcock as having stated 
public.ly ./ that he was assured of forty Democratic senators who would 
vote against ratification of the treaty if it were weighed d01m with 
reservations. This statement played right into the hands of the Repub-
licans, especially the irreconcilables. If the treaty were defeated the 
blame 1-rould be put on the Democrats even though the Republicans were the 
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ones to whom it was unacceptable in the first place. Hitchcock's 
announcement was an open invitation to the Republicans to load the treaty 
down with amendments and reservations in order to make it more onerous 
24 to the Democrats. This example shows how party politics distorted the 
issues and turned the whole question of the league into a farce. The 
league was not being discussed on its own terms but on the basis of what 
one party or the other thought about it. The complete reversal of party 
support from what one would expect to find indicates the ridiculous 
lengths a group of men would to to in rallying around the ~tandard of 
party loyalty. 
Despite his earlier statement, Hitchcock continued to claim that, 
even though the Democrats would vote against the treaty with reservations, 
the treaty was by no means dead. If the Lodge reservations were defeated , 
the Democrats would off er a resolution asking ratification of the 
unamended treaty. If that also failed, the way would then he open for a 
co:mpromise resolution that would permit passage of the treaty. Hitchcock 
believed that he could muster enough votes to get the treaty in a dead-
lock and make this compromise possible. 25 Considering the extreme 
partisanship that characterized the debate over the treaty Hitchcock's 
position was a little ludicrous if not do'lmright naive. He never explained 
how he intended to effect this compromise and he seemed not to grasp 
the difficulties in his plan. 
A further partisan dispute rose out of Hitchcock's plan to try to 
get a compromise resolution. TheRepublicans questioned whether the 
treaty would still technically be under Senate consideration after having 
been defeated twice already. According to the rules of the Senate further 
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consideration depended on the ruling of the presiding officer, in this 
case Vice-President Marshall, a Democrat. Marshall stated that he would 
allow another ratification resolution in the interests of reaching a 
compromise. The Republicans objected vi~orously, saying that a simple 
m['jority vote could overrule the presiding officer's decision and that 
they had enough votes to do so should Yarshall allow another resolution, 26 
This "tlms precisely what did happen. Lodge objected to lfarshall 1 s ruling 
that the treaty be brought back for reconsideration in the Committee of 
the qhole, The question was put to a vote in which the Senate overruled 
the decision on a straight party vote, putting reconsideration in the 
Senate itself instead of the Committee, The Senate also overruled fifty 
to forty-three r~arshall' s ruling that amendments could be made to the 
Lod~e reservations when they were brought back for reconsideration. 27 
In an editorial published two days after the first two defeats of 
•I II 
the treaty, the Richmond Times-Dispatch took an I-told-you-so attitude 
toward the whole subject. The editorial stated that the Democrats had 
been outma"'new.vered in the parliamentary proceedings and had been forced 
into the position of having "to vote for a resolution that so restricted 
the treaty in its operation as virtually to destroy its original vitality, 
or else assume responsibility for its defeat." It was a trap set by the 
Republicans which the Democrats deliberately walked into on the chance of 
getting a vote on an unreserved ratification resolution ·and/or Republican 
support for a compromise. The paper criticized the Democrats for not 
being willing to yield to reservations that would not have really hurt 
the treaty at a time when it would st.ill have been possible for enough 
16 
Republicans to join them in saving the treaty and the league. By the 
time the Democrats realized they had to make s.ome concessions the 
Republicans had a plan and were not about to change their minds. 28 The 
editorial grasped very succinctly the heart of the whole problem of 
ratification. Neither side was willing to bend or take the first step 
for fear of losing party support or of being accused of disloyalty. No 
one really considered what would have to be done to effect a compromise 
because no one ever really expected the debate to reach a stage where 
compromise would have been possible. Subsequent events seem to support 
this contention that compromise was never really possible. 
1'1 <W 
In mid-February~the Republicans took the initiative in bringing 
the treaty containing modified Lodge reservations back to the Senate. 
They believed there would be little or no opposition to these reserva-
tions, since they had been proposed by the mild reservationists. Hitch-
cock gave up on trying to get Democratic modifications to these 
reservations. As long as the situation was still controlled by the 
f{epublicans they were the ones who would have to take the initiative to 
modify the treaty so that it would be acceptable to the Wilson 
supporters. 29 The Republicans were unwilling to modify the reservations 
to suit the Democrats. According to the Republicans, any reservations 
acceptable to the Wilson supporters would be too watered-down to achieve 
the purpose for which they were proposed by the Republicans. It was 
readily apparent that the only hope of ratification lay in a serious 
break of the administration forces. As the final vote approached, the 
Republ.ican leaders hoped that, if ratification failed on the first 
17 
attempt and a second attempt was made, after making their opposition a 
point of recordJenough Democrats would come over to the reservationist 
camp and save the treaty from complete failure,30 A number of Democrats 
did bolt on the final vote but not enough to obtain ratification of the 
treaty. 
Another thread inextricably woven with that of party politics was 
~-Tilson' s participation in and guidance of the whole league fight, He 
was the strongest advocate of an unamended treaty and was determined 
that no one was going to prevent him from achievinE his goal, Hilson 
maintained such strong control over the Democratic membors of the Senate 
that the leaders could neither make a proposal nor accept or reject one 
made by the opposition without first consulting Hilson. From the very 
beginning Wilson was adamant on getting the treaty his own way or not 
getting it at all. In June 1919 the Senate cabled 1:Tilson in Paris and 
asked him to officially Ydease the contents of the treaty to them before 
he returned to the United States, A number of Wall Street businessmen 
already had a copy of the treaty and were using it to their own advantage, 
·.-;ilson refused, saying he had promised not to release the treaty until 
he could lay it before the Senate in person. As soon as he did return 
he held a long conference with Senator Swanson, who was to :open the 
debate in the Senate, There was no record made of their conversation, 
but it was quite possible that rn.::Son suggested to Swanson the major points 
to be included in his speech. Swanson also made clear his own feeling 
that few amendments or reservations would be passed, He based this 
assumption on the fact that, given Wilson's intense desire to see the 
treaty passed without reservations and his power of rejecting the treaty 
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as reported by the Senate if it displeased him, a majority of the Sen1te 
would be willing to go along with ~Tilson 1 s idea. 
During the hearings in the Foreign Relations Com."llittee t~e entire 
com."llittee went to the White House to confer with Hilson on some aspects 
of the peace negotiations knmm only to him. The Republican members of 
the committee were rather dissatisfied with the answers ~Tilson gave to 
their questions. They had been hoping to get supporting evidence from 
Filson for some of their grievances against the treaty. Instead, they 
gave ~·J"ilson an opportunity to present his side of the picture and to 
inspire his supporters to fight more·- fiercely to defeat any amendments. 3l 
The Republican leaders said that the treaty would never pass without 
some kind of reservations, but Wilson remained adamant on unreserved 
\(~':.\ 
ratification. He would not even give his approval to Senator~Pittman 1 s 
proposal for interpretive reservations that would be kept separate from 
the actual ratification resolution. Pittman's proposal was allowed to 
die by the rest of the Democratic leadership because Pittman had failed 
to get it approved by Hilson before announcing it.32 
By early September, however, ':·Tilson had begun to change somewhat 
his attitude toward reservations. He was still completely opposed to 
any changes that would involve sending the treaty back to Paris, but he 
also stated that he would not oppose interpretive reservations if they 
were absolutely necessary. The -president did not consider any of the 
amendments or reservations already proposed as belonging to the second 
category and noted a definite drift to reservations other than interpre-
tive. 33 This last observation became more and more true as the debate 
wore on. After the defeat of the Fall amendments by the opposition of the 
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Democratic minority, the Republicans almost conceded that there would 
be no amendments passed. Instead, they turned their attention to 
pushing for reservations to the ratifying resolution. 
At first the Democrats were uncertain as to how far they would go 
in opposing these reservations. All through the fight over the amendments 
they had solidly supported viilson 1 s program of ratification of a treaty 
that would not have to be resubmitted to the peace conference. If they 
remained loyal to this principle, and there was no reason for them not 
to, they would also vote against any reservations that were unacceptabls 
to the administration. \mile the Lodge reservations were bcinrr debated 
the Democrats decided to ask ~Tilson whether to vomfor ratification of 
the treaty if the reservations were passed, They ·wanted to put the entire 
decision in ';Jilson' s lap and were willing to abide by his decision what-
ever it mie;ht be .J4 Hilson told the Democratic leaders that the reserva-
tions were trying to ac~omplish the same ends as the previously defeated 
amendments and were, therefore, unacceptable to him. The President 
maintained this attitude until the very end, when all hope of ratification 
was past. He even threatened to take.the treaty back and lock it up in 
his desk if the reservations were passed without being modified )5 The 
Democrats attempted to introduce substitute reservations which ;:-:ere 
either turned dovm by Hilson a~ unacceptable or defeated by the 
Republicans. 
~Tilson' s whole attitude during the hearine;s and debates was obstinate. 
an:::. unrelenting. He was absolutely determined that the peace was going 
to be his peace or no peace at all. He could not exercise any real control 
over the Republicans, but he could and did dictate to the Democrats. 
20 
Because the Democrats were willing for the most part to vote the way 
"Wilson wanted ther.i to vote, they never really stopped to consider the 
ir.iplications of their actions. It does not appear that any of them really 
understood what the treaty or the league meant in terms of the future, 
the international situation, or the position of the United States. Hhen 
it finally began to dai-m on them that they were in a hopeless situation 
and that there was almost no possible outcome except defeat of the treaty, 
a little less than half of the Democratic membership decided any treaty 
was better than no treaty at all, regardless of what the President or 
anyone else said, and voted for ratification, Unfortunately, seven more 
votes were needed for passage, but they were not forth corning. The rest 
of the Democrats stuck with ~Tilson and permitted tho treaty to die on 
the Senate floor. 3~ 
The failure of the compromise program was due in largo measure to 
~Tilson 1 s insistence that he have first approval on any proposal made by 
or to the Democrats. Both sides attempted a number of times to reach 
some kind of compromise, but none of the atteripts '1rere successful. 
Although both Republicans and Democrat.s said they were hopin£ for a 
compromise resolution of ratification, neither group was willing to keep 
a really open mind or modify its conditions sufficiently to achieve a 
compromise. Party politics, as well as i1ilson 1 s unyielding attitude, 
played a major part in keeping the lines firm and in preventing any kind 
of agreement. 
The Democrats started off 'with a qualification to any type of com-
promise that might be proposed. They could only accept modifications or 
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reservations that Hilson would approve. Swanson indicated, after his 
talk with Wilson on July 10, that the Democrats Hould support certain 
reservations as long as these changes did not reake the covenant super-
ficial or take away all of its real meaning.37 The stipulation obviously 
limited the ability of the Democratic leaders to bargain with the opponents 
of the treaty for a settlement that would be acceptable to both sides. 
Dy early Hovember it had become obvious that the Democrats were 
getting nowhere in their ratification fight. Hilson had continued to 
ignore those senators who told him, as did Senator ~fatson (Rep.) of 
Indiana, that the only way to get the Unitod States into tho Loaguo of 
~fations was to accept the Lodge reservations, He refused to even listen 
to any reservations that would, as he put it, "nullify" the league. With 
the situation becoming more hopeless every day, Hitchcock went to visit 
r.frlson. His task was to tell Hilson that the Democrats could not raise 
even a simple majority, much less the required two-thirds, fo1ratifica-
tion of the treaty without reservations. He urged the President to 
compromise on the Lodge proposals as the only means of getting the United 
States into the league. Hilson answered emphatically to let Lodge do 
the compromising if any were to be done. 3itchcock then suggested that 
perhaps Lodge 1·1ould do this if the President indicated in some way that 
he was willing to make peace with the Tiepublicans. Hilson's reply to this 
suggestion was complete indignation. Se told Hitchcock that the first 
r:i.ove and most of the concessions would have to come from Lodge, not from 
any Democrat, especially himself. JS Granted that 1:lilson was a sick man 
and might not have understood exactly how bad the situation was, this was 
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still a rather astounding position for the President to take. His 
refusal to make any effort at compromise, when failure to do so meant 
almost certain defeat of a measure that he saw as the only means of 
achieving world peace, seems to be completely inexplicable. 
Despite this adamant refusal the Democrats made another attempt to 
find out what the President would accept in the way of reservations. Thoy 
asked Lodge to write doim what he would ask for if Hilson agreed to 
accept private terms given by Lodge. This list of terms Fas sent to tho 
"'ihite House, but it was never mentioned ac;ain by either side. Lodge took 
this lack of a reply as the final insult and ceased making any attrimpt to 
bargain with Wilson. Hitchcock realized that there was no way to pass 
the treaty as the President wanted it. By securin~ the support of the 
mild reservationists, who only wanted safeguards on the uso of United 
States troops, he hoped to be able to bring about passage of a modified 
treaty.39 With this end in mind the mild reservationists started a 
compromise move that would have permitted acceptance of the reservations 
of the Foreign Relations Committee without the requirerient that they 
had to be approved by the other powers. This would have eliminated one 
of Wilson's major objections'.: to the reservations. At the same time the 
mild reservationists announced that they were not entirely opposed to 
modification of the committee reservations but that they would vote 
LtQ 
against the administration!s program.' 
In a last ditch effort Lodge and Hitchcock held a conference just 
prior to the first vote on the treaty. At this conference they agreed to 
allow a vote to be taken on unreserved ratification before the vote on 
the corr.!nittee resolution of ratification containing the Lodce reservations. 
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This was What the Democrats had been fighting for all the time. In 
return the Democrats submitted to Lodge a proposed set of compromise 
reservations showing the modifications necessary to obtain Democratic 
support for the reserved treaty. Lodge insisted that all compromise 
efforts had to be made before any vote was taken on the committee 
resolution. 41 Clearly Lodge wanted to know for exactly what concessions 
the Democrats were asking before he went into the final debate and vote. 
He was confident the Republicans could defeat the resolution of 
unreserved ratification no matter When it was voted on. He lost nothing 
_ in agreeing to have it voted on first. Be probably saw it as civine: hiP'l 
a certain psychological advantage over his opponents since he had refused 
to accept the modified reservations proposed by '.Iitchcock. If the 
Democrats saw that their unreserved resolution had failed and realized 
that the choice was a reserved treaty or no treaty at all, enouch of 
them might have been willing to vote for the reserved treaty to obtain 
its passage. Lodge's mai\eu..vers did not work in November, but the 
situation in March followed his reasoning almost exactly. 
Developments between November and March brought no real chanEe in 
the status of the compromise efforts. _ A bipartisan committee attempted 
to draft a set of reservations that would be acceptable to a two-thirds 
majority of the Senate. It was almost prevented from meeting by 
Senator Lodge, who tried to keep the com.mttee under his thumb because 
he feared it might upset his plans. At the same time a g:roup of thirty 
Democratic senators met and declared themselves in favor of interpretive 
reservations. Some of these Democrats accepted a number of the Lodge 
reservation, and it appeared that the treaty might pass on the votes of 
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these Democrats and the Republican mild reservationists, The irrecon-
cilables prevented this, however, by threatening to repudiate Lodge's 
leadership. Lodge was forced to give in and to agree that the reserva-
tion would remain as they were introduced, The bipartisan conference 
( Lol\e<:.-hue. !.c.c.~~ ') 
committee broke up ·over the reservation to Article X~of the League of 
Nations Covenant, The Democrats were 1rillinP' to accent the Taft u • 
rewording of Lodge's original proposal, but LodQ:e was forced by the 
irreconcilables to refuse even this concession.42 Party politics 
prevented Lodge from accepting a compromise that had a fairly ~ood 
chance of being passed, 
In February Carter Glass, new junior senator from Vire;inia, made 
another attempt at a compromise, After talking 1·.rith many Republican 
senators, he discovered that they were willing to back down on their 
demands if ~Tilson would aP-"ree to accept the Taft reservation to Article X1 
wlr.":.h """'' "'"-""'\'j a.. \e.».>o~a'°"'J ~-!he. ""':'.i"''a..l 1-od')~ ru;;cvvcdiCYI +t> +\..Ill. ax+\c.ll!,., 
He wrote to Uilson agreeing that it would be a betrayal of the Democratic 
Party to accept the Lodge reservations but pointing out that the party 
ffiUst be able to say it tried every possible means to compromise short 
of completely destroying the treaty, If the Taft reservation uere 
proposed by the Democrats and then votf!!d doim by the Republicans, 
responsibility for defeat of the treaty would rest on the Republicans, 
not on the Democrats, Promising that ~·Tilson' s name would be kept com-
pletely out of the discussion, Glass asked for 1.rilson' s approval before 
introducing the reservation. ':Tilson 1 s reply questioned the good faith 
of Taft's proposal and stated that the Democrats takinG the initiative at 
this point llas probably all wrong.43 Glass said that his sug~estion was 
not intended to change the Democrats 1 stand, only to sound out the 
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?.epublicans: however, if the President felt it irould be detririEJntal to 
the party, he would drop the whole subject. Again a Democrat, a~ainst 
his own better judgment, had bowed to the wishes of the President. 
The lack of understanding of what the peace treaty, and especially 
the League of Nations, really meant or could have meant to the United 
States seemed to affect most of the senators, President Wilson, and 
a large portion of the general public. Partisanship and a certain 
naivete characterized the entire Senate debate on the treaty. Eost 
of the senators labored under some kind of preconception about the 
treaty and the league. They saw the league as either the greatest 
hope for world peace or as an instrument for involving the United 
States in squabbles in which it had no real interest. Because of these 
preconceptions and the partisanship none of the men involved in 
consideration of the Treaty of Versailles had a very realistic picture 
of the treaty or the League of Nations. Perhaps if they had been 
more willing to keep an open mind and to consider the treaty objectively 
the outcome might have been different. At the very least the treaty 
would have received a fairer hearing and, if defeated, would have been 
voted down on its mm merits or lack thereof. 
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